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The importance that the development of small firms has had 
for the Italian economy in the last ten years is widely 
recognized. This development can be seen as one of the most 
significant aspects of the process of adjustment to the economic 
and social tensions of the 1970s. The term "adjustment" 
emphasizes that this process was largely unplanned, though it 
was influenced by political decisions or, more frequently, non­
decisions. In the absence of effective long-term economic 
interventions at the central level, the growth of small firms 
has, in fact, been based on certain economic, social and 
political resources which v/ere widely available in some local 
areas. These allowed smaller productive units to avail of the 
opportunities for development which were opened up by changes in 
technology, in the organisation of work and in market structures. 
Furthermore, the strengthening of the unions in large- firms, 
which occurred in the early 1970s, contributed, especially in the 
initial stages, to the growth of small firms. The study of the 
political economy of small firms and of its relationship with the 
overall political economy seems, therefore, particularly 
interesting in the Italian context.
The regions in which small firms predominate, Emilia, 
Tuscany, Umbria, the Marches, Veneto, Trentino and Friuli, are 




























































































though the phenomenon is also to be found in the north-west, 
where, however, the large firms undergoing restructuring and the 
large metropolitan areas are, for the most part, concentrated, 
and in the south, where the major problems remain those 
associated with underdevelopment. The regions of the "Third 
Italy" are, therefore, characterized, from the economic point of 
view, by the marked predominance of small and medium-sized firms: 
about 80% of those employed in industry is concentrated in 
productive units of less than 200 employees, the average size is 
less than 10 employees per unit and this average decreased during 
the 1970s. Indicators such as the rate of growth of value-added, 
investment, productivity and employment show the marked dynamism 
of industry in these areas. The "traditional" sectors of 
industry - textiles, clothing, shoes and furniture - predominate 
but there is also a significant development of "modern" sectors, 
particularly the machine tool industry. Small firms tend to be 
found clustered together in "industrial districts", that is they 
form integrated territorial systems with strong sectorial 
specialization. These districts usually coincide with small 
urban areas and consist of one or more communes.
Numerous economic studies of the small-firm economy have 
been carried out. These clearly indicate that there is a 
relationship between this form of development and the social 
context in which occurs. Less attention has been devoted, 
however, to the role of the local political context. Yet, the 




























































































as similar areas in Piedmont and Lombardy) are usually 
characterized by the existence of specific subcultures. In these 
areas, one often finds the predominance of a particular political 
tradition, whose origins generally go back to the beginnings of 
the century and a complex of institutions (parties, interest 
groups and cultural and welfare structures) which derive from the 
same politico-ideological matrix. The central regions, which were 
originally socialist in orientation, are now Communist 
strongholds while there is a deeply-rooted Catholic subculture in 
the regions of the north-east (Fig.l).
Insert Figure 1 here
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the 
political context of "diffuse industrialization", particularly to 
those aspects that concern interest representation and its 
effects on industrial relations and on the activity of local 
government. I shall try to show that these aspects have played 
an important, though varying, role in the forms of regulation of 
the small-firm economy, especially in the context of strong 
political subcultures. The role of the local political system is 
rendered even more important by the process of modernization at 
present underway. The following observations are not intended, 
however, to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the 
development of small firms and of the links between this 




























































































to contribute to the analysis of the political economy of small- 
firm areas by focusing on certain factors which have been, 
generally, overlooked. For these purposes, the concept of "neo­
localism" is put forward and the role of this type of regulation 
in the "success" of the small firm economy as well as the 
constraints that it seems to impose on the process of development 
are discussed.
Despite the importance of the local level for it s
development, diffuse industrialization affects not only the
"periphery". It also influences and is conditioned by the central 
political economy. The final part of the article is devoted, 
therefore, to a discussion of some hypotheses on the relationship 
between neo-localism on the one hand and central "concertation" 
involving government and interest groups on the other. These two 
phenomena, which have attracted increasing attention in recent 
years, are usually considered separately. We shall, however, try 
to elucidate the consequences of their "contradictory • co­
existence" .
Some preliminary warnings are necessary. The concept of 
neo-localism is used in an ideal-typical sense in the following 
analysis. It cannot be applied directly to describe the 
mechanisms of regulation that prevail in individual small-firm 
areas nor is it intended to reduce adjustments that vary 
considerably from area to area to a single model. Its purpose 




























































































to a greater or lesser extent, in the various concrete 
situations. The observations on this theme are based on the 
results of a research project on the social and political 
characteristics of small-firm areas. The project consisted of 
case-studies of two typical areas with differing political 
subcultures, Bassano in Veneto and Valdelsa in Tuscany, as well 
as an anlaysis of some current trends in the central and north­
eastern regions. In Veneto and Tuscany, a study on interest 
representation at a regional level was also carried out. Given 
the aims of the present article, however, reference to the 
research data is limited and is used mainly to illustrate the 
hypotheses presented. Moreover, only those aspects which are 
directly related to the themes considered are touched upon (1).
Dualism or neo-localism?
It is not necessary to provide a detailed account of the f-he 
problématique of research on small firms in any detail here. For 
our purposes, it is sufficient to recall some essential points. 
The interpretations of the origins and characteristics of this 
form of development have been progressively refined over time. 
In the early stages, in the wake of the debate on the 
differentiation of the labour market and decentralization of 
production, the emphasis was on the idea that the development of 
small firms was induced and brought about, principally, by the 




























































































them by the unions by devolving parts of the productive process 
to smaller firms. Their aim was to reduce labour costs and to re­
establish the flexibility of the work-force (2).
This initial conception was later complicated by various 
developments. Economic research showed that, in some areas, the 
relationships between firms could not be wholly explained by the 
phenomenon of decentralization introduced for the purposes of 
cutting labour costs. These relationships often entailed 
increased specialization and division of labour among firms. 
These were rooted in economies, external to the single units of 
production, but internal to the industrial district in which they 
were located (3). The same studies stressed that changes in 
technology and the growth of demand for non-standarized goods 
enhanced the chances of autonomy and innovation for small firms.
At the same time, another line of research, this one 
sociologically oriented, contributed to the clarification of 
certain essential points. It was pointed out that small firms are 
concentrated, mainly, in the central and north-eastern regions 
(Bagnasco,1977). In these areas a trend of autonomous 
development emerged. This was not primarily brought about by the 
decentralization of existing production, though it was combined 
with the latter in various ways according to the sectorial 
specialization of industrial districts. The role of traditional 
institutions and identities is considered, by this approach, to




























































































the acceptance of this development by the local communities. In 
particular, some studies have examined the characteristics of the 
family and its relationship with the small firm economy from this 
perspective (Ardigo, Donati, 1976; Paci, ed. , 1980 ).
Our research can also be located within this approach. The 
specific objective, however was not only to explore the original 
institutional context but also to indicate the influence that the 
changes occurring in this context can have for economic 
development. The results of this research indicate that diffuse 
industrialization is supported by a complex institutional 
structure which consists, not only of social components like the 
family or the local community, but also of a specific form of 
interest representation which influences industrial relations and 
the activity of local government. Of course, caution must be 
exercised in any attempt to generalize from individual local or 
regional cases. The equilibrium which is established between the 
market and social and political structures in the regulation of 
the small-firm economy, in fact, vary considerably, from area to 
area. It seems, nevertheless, possible to hypothesize that a 
strong subculture provides resources which are favourable to 
particular forms of polit ical regulation of diffuse 
industrialization. Obviously, as we shall see, the different 
subcultural matrices, the period in which economic development 





























































































Even with these limitations, there is sufficient evidence to 
question a widespread conception (which is influenced by the 
early discussions on the decentralization of production) which 
underestimates the importance of interest representation of 
workers involved in the small-firm economy. Using a concept 
recently proposed by John Goldthorpe to analyze current 
tendencies in some Western countries, including Italy, we could 
define this approach in terms of dualism. The concept is not 
used in the accepted definitive meaning of the term in economic 
literature but refers exclusively to interest representation. It 
is used with reference to forms of political economy which 
involve the development of productive and occupational situations 
in which the representation of workers' interests by trade unions 
is excluded or strongly discouraged. The use of a migrant 
workforce, the prevalence of precarious and illegal work 
relations and the development of productive decentralization and 
of small firms are considered as indicators of this type of 
political economy. From this perspective, therefore, a small 
firm economy is seen as one pole of a dualism which, unlike the 
large firm and unionized sectors, is regulated, primarily, by 
market mechanisms.
In reality, however, things appear to be more complicated, 
at least as far as Italy is concerned. Dualism, in the sense 
indicated above, is certainly present and it should not be 
overlooked. Nevertheless, the development of small firms demands 




























































































necessary to draw attention to two aspects in particular. First, 
the data acquired so far show that the phenomenon cannot be 
reduced to a process of fragmentation of production motivated by 
a search for low labour costs and greater flexibility of the 
workforce. In the more autonomous and advanced parts of the 
small-firm economy union representation is, usually, present. 
Secondly, the various components of the productive structure are 
generally embedded in a particular institutional context which 
interacts with the market and conditions the effects of the 
latter on the life chances of the people involved. There exists, 
in short, a process of "social construction of the market" 
(Bagnasco, 1985) which dualist-type models tend to overlook.
Within the "industrial district", not only the small firms, 
but also market mechanisms and social institutions such as the 
family, the kinship network and the local community are closely 
interwoven. Social structures provide cultural and material 
resources for the development of entrepreneurship and of flexible 
productive structures. They also mitigate the effects of the 
market, arising from discontinuity of employment, on social 
relations and enable the costs of the reproduction of labour to 
be lowered and incomes to be supplemented and brought up to 
acceptable levels. Furthermore, the persistence of community 
values which cut across social classes, the low degree of 
polarization of the class structure and high social mobility play 




























































































These social aspects of the regulation of the small firm 
economy are already well-known and have been examined by various 
studies. The studies carried out in Veneto and Tuscany also show 
that they are of great importance. Nevertheless, the insistence 
on the traditional localism-market duality runs the risk of being 
misleading, especially when it is applied to those areas where 
industrialization is more consolidated and where there is a well- 
established political subculture. In these situations, the role 
played by interest representation through industrial relations 
and the activity of local government must also be taken into 
consideration. On a more general level, it is also necessary to 
bear in mind that,in the small-firm areas, the thrust of economic 
development and of the cultural opening-up of the local society 
brings about a shift in the boundaries between the market and 
traditional social and political structures. An increase in the 
importance of the latter tends to occur, principally, at the 
expense of traditional localism.
The concept of "neo-localism" can be used to illustrate the 
more complex interdependence between the various mechanisms of 
regulation at local level and to draw attention to the role that 
is played by interest representation. The concept is used here 
to identify the particular division of labour between market, 
social structures and, to an increasing extent, political 
structure. This mechanism made the local economy highly flexible 
and adaptable to rapid market changes in sectors with wide 




























































































redistribution, within the local society, of both the social 
costs of and the benefits accruing from economic development. We 
shall now examine the role played by interest representation in 
this context .
Union representation
V In looking at the role of interest representation in small- 
firm areas, one must first of all point out that this 
representation has a long history which is closely connected to 
the origins and development of the local Socialist and Catholic 
subcultures. It is not possible to examine this history in any
depth here (4), but one should emphasize the fact that, in the 
central and north-eastern regions, the Socialist and Catholic 
movements were very active from the end of the 19th century 
onwards. Their roots in the local society are not only deeper 
and stronger than in other parts of the country but the 
traditions themselves have assumed a particular character in that 
they have produced territorially-based political subcultures. >: 
Neither the social influence nor the political representation of 
these subcultures was confined to specific groups: they tended, 
rather, to cut across class boundaries and to assume wider 
community dimensions.
It is possible to identify some of the historical conditions 




























































































class structure of the central and north-eastern parts of the 
country which was based on agricultural work of a predominantly 
autonomous variety (sharecropping, peasant and tenant farming); 
a thick network of small artisan and commercial centres which had 
enough resources to establish a clear identity and to organize 
themselves; and a secular (republican, radical or anarchist) 
tradition in the central areas and i\ predominantly Catholic 
tradition in the north-east. The interaction between these 
factors, following the development of capitalism and the creation 
of the nation state, i.e. between the end of the 19th and the
beginning of the 20th centuries, favoured the establishment of
VIsocialism in some areas and of the Catholic movement m  others.
It is important to emphasize that the differing territorial 
subcultures that arose from the consolidation of these movements 
had a particular feature in common: both tried, albeit in
different ways, to defend the local society from the changes 
brought about by the market and by the state and tried to halt 
the process of social disintegration and to contain that of 
proletarianization by experimenting with localized forms of 
organisation. In the red areas, this process developed through a 
complex series of relationships, involving unions, labour 
organisations, friendly societies, cooperatives and communes, 
which characterized the lively "municipal socialism" of the 
beginning of the century. In the white areas, organisations of a 
specifically union-type were less developed but there was a 




























































































organizations, cooperatives, friendly societies and charities,al1 
of which were linked, in one way or another, to the local Church. 
In both the red and white areas, the defence of the local society 
involved some form of relationship with the "centre", i.e. with 
the national state. This relationship had both conflictual and 
contractual elements and the former were often used to improve 
the terms of political bargains. A typical example of this is 
the activity of the parliamentary socialists in favour of co­
operatives and communes. This type of relationship between 
centre and periphery is related to the fact that both socialists 
and Catholics were excluded, in varying ways and for varying 
reasons, from the central political power. This exclusion drove 
them into organizing and strengthening their position at a local 
level where conditions were more favourable.
There are, of course, differences in the strength of the 
subcultures and in the periods in which they emerged and were 
established. As far as the areas under socialist control are 
concerned, for example, the phenomenon is certainly more 
widespread and consolidated in Emilia Romagna and in certain 
areas of Tuscany than it is in Umbria and the Marches where 
socialist penetration of the countryside seems to have occurred, 
principally, after World War I and where the social network of 
associations appears to have remained relatively underdeveloped 
even after that date. In the same way, the Catholic subculture 
was stronger in some areas of east Lombardy, such as Bergamo and 




























































































Padua than in other parts of the north-east. Our interest lies,
however, in emphasizing the emergence of a model of
représentât ion which had strongly localist connotations and
t hrough which, in the face of the weakness of the central state
and of the vertical structures of representation - parties, 
unions and interest groups - a decentralized political economy 
was established. The subculture fostered the emergence of 
particular local political systems.
It is impossible to examine the historical evolution of this 
phenomenon, which involves the establishment, after Fascism and 
the war, of the PCI and the DC in those areas which had 
originally been under socialist and Catholic influence, here (5).
The context in which these territorial subcultures emerged did, 
however, have certain consequences for the political economy of 
small firm areas. We should like to draw attention to two 
aspects in particular: the existence of a reservoir of resources 
for the organization of interests; and the influence of this on a 
model of representation which was conditioned, to a significant 
extent, by local and political constraints. We shall try to give 
an outline description of how these elements combined by 
examining industrial relations and the activity of local 
government.





























































































As we have already noted, the idea that areas of small-firm 
development are characterised by weakness of trade unions and by
\ipoorly institutionalized industrial relations is widely held. If 
we consider the data on unionization (Fig.2), however, the 
picture appears to be somewhat lesf* simple and straightforward. 
In 1961, when the process of small-firm growth was just 
beginning, or had not yet started, the rate of unionization in 
industry (CGIL+CISL) was highest in the red regions of the 
centre. In the white regions of the north-east, the rate was a 
little lower than in the "industrial triangle", where the large 
enterprises were fully developed. ' There was a marked increase in 
unionization in the following years, particularly in the 1970s. 
In 1977, the highest rates of industrial (and, indeed, overall) 
unionization were to be found in the small-firm regions. This 
leading position was consolidated in the early 1980s when these 
regions suffered less than the north-west from the fall in 
unionization that occurred at the time (6).
V The differences that exist among the various regions (Fig.3) 
suggest caution in the interpretation of data on unionization. 
The time at which economic development occurred and sectorial
specialization, which influences the characteristics of the
Vworkforce (7), must be kept in mind. It would, nevertheless, be 
difficult to explain the dynamism of the phenomenon in regions 
like Veneto, Emilia or Tuscany without reference to the resources 




























































































very fragmented productive structure, such as is found in small- 
firm areas, hinders the development of unionization, especially 
from an organisational point of view. It should also be pointed 
out that the CGIL (the Communist-Socialist union) predominates in 
the red and the CISL (the Catholic union) in the white areas 
(Fig.4), even though an "area of union monopoly" exists, really, 
only in the first case (Rossi, 1980). In the regions of the 
north-east, the CISL is stronger than in other parts of the 
country but the CGIL is also represented to a significant extent.
Insert Figure 4 about here
The influence of the local context is also confirmed by the 
studies carried out in the white area of Veneto (Bassano) and the 
red area of Tuscany (Valdelsa). In the first case, the existence 
of a long-established Catholic associational network and, 
especially, the position of influence held by the ACLI 
(Associazione Cattolica Lavoratori Italiani) favoured the 
consolidation of the CISL. In 1982, the rate of unionization of 
workers in small firms in this area was 48% but it fell to 17%
for those employed in artisan enterprises with less than 10
employees. In Valdelsa, a gradual shift in union representation 
from the agricultural sector to that of small firms was
facilitated by the existence of a very strong share-croppers' 
organization in the 1950s as well as by the considerable
organization and strength of the Communist party in the area. 




























































































though the rate was considerably lov/er in the artisan sector in 
this area too.
The two case studies are, of course, very typical but they 
highlight some processes that seem to acquire a more general 
significance in the light of the data previously analysed (8). 
VJe can maintain that the political subculture provided
institutional and identity resources which favoured the
organization of workers in small-firm districts, particularly in 
industrial enterprises with more than 50 employees. This process 
was more marked in areas with a red subculture, especially in 
those with a stronger associational traditional.
Up to now we have described an important, though often 
underemphasized aspect of interest representation in areas of 
small-firm development. The existence of various levels of worker 
organization, though crucial, cannot, however, in itself provide 
an adequate explanation of the nature of that representation. In"/ 
this regard,' it is necessary to establish the direction taken by 
union activity and the consequences of this. If we consider the 
data on conflictuality in the period between the late 1960s and 
the early 1980s, we see that the severity of strikes (hours of 
work lost per striker) was markedly lower in small firm regions 
than in a typical large-firm region like Piedmont. Though the 
results are similar in all small-firm areas, these are due to 
varying factors in the different regions. The regions with the 




























































































high rate of participation (strikers per strike) but a low rate 
of severity while the "white" regions, Trentino, Veneto and 
Friuli, have an appreciably lower participation rate and a 
relatively higher level of severity, although the latter is still 
less than that found in Piedmont. The Marches and Umbria have 
both low participation and low severity rates (9).
Insert Table I about here
Unionization and conflictuality wouLd seem, therefore, to 
have a particular, though differentiated pattern in small firm 
areas. A substantial level of unionization is accompanied by a 
low level of conflictuality. It would, however, be mistaken to 
conclude that unionization is to be considered as a consequence 
of the particular political subculture and that it has a 
negligible effect on industrial relations in small-firm areas. 
This view has often been put forward, particularly to explain the 
situation in the red areas.
There is no doubt that the local subculture did impose 
constraints on union activity in the initial stages of economic 
development. It is not difficult to find evidence of this in both 
the red and the white areas (10). In the former, the strategies 
adopted by the PCI certainly did encourage policies which were 
favourable to small firms, while the growth of the CISL in the 
white areas,in the initial stage of development, was also largely 



























































































entrepreneurs and this reduces the autonomy of the unions. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that this situation has 
changed.
V The labour costs of industrial enterprises increased m  the 
70s and, in almost all the srnall-firm areas they came close to 
the national average and to that of Piedmont (Bagnasco, Pini, 
1981). The available data and studies that have already been
carried out lead us to hold that this tendency was influenced by
•ja considerable amount of negotiation on a firm level. For 
example, a regional study on Veneto in the period 1979-1980 found 
that 42% of industrial enterprises with more than 20 employees 
were involved in negotiations at firm level (Giubilato, 1982). 
This percentage was considerably higher for firms with more than 
50 employees. The vast majority of firms above this threshold of 
size in Emilia and Tuscany also seem to have been involved in 
firm-level negotiations (Brusco, 1980; Ires-CGIL Emilia Romagna 
1983a; 1983b). In the studies on Bassano and Valdelsa, the rates 
found for industrial enterprises were 45% and 60%, respectively.
Agreements at firm level were concerned, for the most part, 
with factors like wages and differentials (ratings). More 
innovative aspects relating to the processes of restructuring, 
mobility and decentralization of production (such as, for 
example, the "right to information" and the negotiation of 
employment levels) are dealt with hardly at all or in a ritual 



























































































organization of work, which had, in the past, played an important 
role in firm negotiations in large factories, appears not to have 
been an issvie at all (11).
Caution should, obviously, be exercised in generalizing from 
these tendencies and the differences between the areas in terms 
of wage benefits and differentials should not be underestimated. 
In Valdclsa, for example, we found that the wages negotiated at 
firm or area level were higher than in Dassano and in the 
furniture sector exceeded the wage determined at the national 
level by 20%. Differences also emerged in the average level of 
ratings. The degree of local coordination and formalization of 
negotiations is also higher in the red areas. Issues such as 
working hours and overtime are more frequently the subject of 
negotiations than in Bassano (in 33% of the cases compared to 40% 
in Bassano). The fact remains, however, that despite these 
differences, negotiations at firm level are carried out in an 
atmosphere of lov; conflictuality (in both areas about 70% of the 
entrepreneurs declare themselves to be satisfied with industrial 
relations, while the opinion of entrepreneurs on this subject on
a national level is clearly negative). Negotiations at firm
V
level bring particularly economic benefits to industrial workers, 
especially those in firms with more than 50 employees and they do 
not impose rigid constraints on labour mobility and flexibility 
which are fairly high in both areas. Workers often move from one 
firm to another (about 60% of the workers changed firm more than 





























































































third to a quarter - said that they worked more than eicjht hours 
a day "in busy periods" and that they worked on Saturdays and 
holidays. Interruptions of working activity because of a fall in 
production are widespread.
In the light of these data, it does not seem possible to 
explain the relationship between high unionization and low 
conflictuality in terms of the hypothesis that stresses the 
subcultural charact or of unionization and sees it as having 
little effect on industrial relations. The qualitative data on 
conflictuality, to which we have already referred, can be 
interpreted in another way. These data do not necessarily 
indicate union weakness or, in the case of the "red" areas 
(Emilia and Tuscany), a predominantly political type of 
conflictuality which is expressed through high participation and 
short duration of strikes. They are also consistent with a 
negotiational and localist model of representation. This is 
quite different from the conflictual trade unionism of the large 
factories in the 1970s which has dominated the scientific and 
political debate on ttie subject.
Further and more detailed research, as well as a thorough 
examination of the variations in industrial relations, are 
necessary before any satisfactory generalizations can be made. A 
provisional synthesis can lie proposed, however, in the following 
terms on the basis of the data to which wc have already referred: 




























































































political subcultures favoured the growth of unionization but, at 
the same time, it contributed to directing union activity so that 
it neither hinders the process of economic development nor 
weakens the local subculture itself. These original constraints 
have not prevented trade unions from growing in strength and from 
increasing their own margin of autonomy over time. This seems to 
have been achieved (though with specific differences that should 
not be underestimated) by means of a process of adjustment which 
involved using available resources to bring advantages to union 
members either in economic terms through single firm or single 
area negotiations or by means of providing services 
(consultation, assistance, patronage etc.)
On the other hand, this tendency has been influenced by the 
characteristics of the working class in small-firm areas (12), 
such as, for example, the low proletarization of this social 
group which derives from the predominant forms of the 
organization of work, from its deep-rooted ties with the 
traditional institutional and cultural context (family and local 
community) and from the opportunities for individual-family 
mobility offered by diffuse industrialization. These factors, 
which were particularly important in the first stage of 
development, were certainly not very favourable to the militant 
unionism that prevailed in the large firms and industrial cities 
at the time, though it is important to remember that the latter 




























































































small-firm areas and that it produced new forms of conflict as 
well as internal changes within the political subcultures (13).
On the whole, however, structural constraints and the 
characteristics of the working class directed the unions towards 
a negot iat ional and localist type of representation. This can be 
seen in negotiations at firm and area level. Though these were 
more or less formalized, they, nevertheless, reflected the 
compatabi1 ity of local political and economic systems. There 
are, of course, likely to be even substantial differences in the 
extent and effects of various negotiations. In general, however, 
union agreements and activity did not impose rigid constraints on 
the mobility and flexibility of the workforce. In exchange, the 
unions obtained benefits of a prevalently economic type and a 
high level of recognition on the part of the entrepreneurs. In 
this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind that the rate of 
membership of business associations is probably higher that it is 
usually thought to be in small-firm areas. Comparable regional 
data are not available but in both Valdelsa and Bassano, more 
than two thirds of the artisan and industrial enterprises 
supported organizations of their category. The majority of the 
entrepreneurs, moreover, said that they were in favour of "stable 
relationships with union organizations" and 60% in Veneto and 45% 
in Bassano reported that they had "frequent contacts" with the




























































































It is within this general context that the role of internal 
dualism in the industrial relations of the individual areas is to 
be considered. This role is always present but its importance 
varies according to the local economic and political context. 
•Workers organizations are less likely to be found in smaller and, 
particularly, artisan firms where there are also some legal 
limitations on union activity. These firms are often tied to 
larger enterprises through the decentralization of production 
which is rarely an issue in union activity or negotiations. This 
dualism allows firms in the industrial sector to cushion the 
costs of union representation to a certain extent. On the other 
hand, family and community ties help to moderate the effects of 
discont inuity in employment and of lower pay for workers involved 
in the sectors not protected by unions. For example, the wives 
and children of unionized workers in industrial firms are often 
employed in these sectors.
The factors discussed up to now show that there is a complex 
inter-relationship, on a local level, between market, traditional 
social structures and interest representation. A consideration 
of local government .activity should further add to our 
understanding of the small firm economy and,indeed, the influence 





























































































The role of local government
We have already referred to the role played in the "defence 
of the local society" by the Socialist and Catholic subcultures 
at the beginning of the century. With the development of small 
firms, one could say that this role has been revived, though 
obviously in different forms and contexts, within the processes 
of interest mediation in the individual areas.
In the climate of marked ideological conflict that 
characterized the 1950s, the activity of the Communist and 
Catholic institutional networks was directed, principally, at 
defending, reproducing and reinforcing their respective 
subcultures. The Communist party and the Catholic Church assumed 
a primary role in this phase and they controlled and coordinated 
local institutions (14). The communes were among these 
institutions and, though these did undertake concrete 
interventions in the social field, they were also used, to a 
significant extent, to consolidate local political identity. This 
trend was typical of the red areas in particular. Given the 
exclusion of the PCI from the central power, the activity of the 
local governments controlled by the party was directed, largely, 
at supporting local political mobilization and at channelling 
demands and pressures towards the central institutions. The 
choice of a balanced budget in the communes, which was abandoned 
in the 19G0s, is significant from this point of view. This 




























































































often, as far as left-wing administrations were concerned, 
discriminât ion,hut it also reflected a more general orientation 
of the Communist subculture which was directed, above all, at 
defending and consolidating the local political identity (15). As 
far as the white administrations were concerned, the choice of a 
restrictive budgetary policy arose from a tradition of minimal 
direct intervention on the part of the communes, a policy that 
was maintained in the following period. In this phase, however, 
one can note that the degree of autonomy of the DC and the 
communal administrations from the local Church was very limited.
Things changed in the following period. It is possible to 
discern a shift towards a more concrete and relevant role of 
local governments and unions in the mediation of local interests. 
This came about within the context of changes on a national 
political level which opened up greater opportunities for the 
activity of local agencies, particularly in the 1970s. The 
development of small firms was, nevertheless, an endogenous . and 
essential condition for this process. The existence of deep- 
rooted traditional social structures and identities did, as we 
have emphasized, facilitate the transformation of the economy and 
the latter, in its turn, led to a smooth, non-traumatic 
redefinition of these resources. Thus, a specific space was 
opened up for local government activity which began to supplement 





























































































In order to clarify the nature and consequences of this 
process further, a series of factors must be considered. The 
parties which controlled local governments, the DC and PCI, 
enjoyed a high level of ideological consensus. The support was, 
in fact, an expression of overall cultural identity which, 
especially in the smaller centres, cut across the class structure 
and assumed a community character. This generalized support 
freed the administrators from the necessity of satisfying very 
specific and sectorial demands (16). Moreover, even though the 
DC and the PCI were often part of coalition councils, they 
enjoyed a dominant role because of their strength in the local 
subcultures. This factor may have contributed to increasing the 
stability and decision-making capacity of local governments (17).
There are, of course, differences in the ways in which the 
parties held and exercised power and influence. In particular, 
one can hypothesize that the DC had a more marked inter-class 
orientation than the PCI. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note that, because of their original characteristics, the social 
bases of both subcultures included various classes to a greater 
extent than in other areas. The development of small firms 
modified this situation over time and the differences between the 
subcultures were, as we shall see, accentuated. But this came 
about in a gradual and non-traumatic way so that the local 
governments were, for a long time, able to enjoy a reservoir of 
consensus that freed them from satisfying particular demands.




























































































communal policies in regions of small-firm development compared 
to large-firm or underdeveloped areas. Diffuse
industrialization, particularly in its initial stage, limited the 
problems that local governments had to face. The fact that the 
traditional family and the community background were not changed, 
that there was no great inflow of immigrants and that employment 
and consumption were sustained not only facilitated the task of 
the communal administrations but these factors also allowed the 
traditional institutions and local interest groups to be used in 
the regulation of the industrial districts.
i
In summary,the policies adopted by the communes were aimed 
at maximizing the resources available (and these included 
applying pressure at a regional and central level) in order to 
favour agreements among the various interests involved in the 
development of small firms. The activity of local government 
included both direct policies in support of economic development 
and, especially, policies in the social field which were directed 
at mediating the effects of the market as a regulator of the 
economy and of employment. The creation of industrial estates for 
small firms, the provision of professional training and of 
infrastructure and support for the format ion of consortia among 
the firms for the purposes of marketing or export facilities are
i
examples of the first type of policy. Communes also became 
increasingly involved in attempts to find solutions to crises in 
those firms which were particularly important to the economy and 




























































































pressure on regional and national governments to grant redundancy 
payments to the workers and, even, interceding with local banks 
on questions of credit. It also involved mediating between local 
unions and entrepreneurs.
The communes, however, have limited powers in the economic 
field. They were able to contribute to the creation of 
additional advantages for the firms but, basically, they fostered 
a process of economic growth which was not politically 
determined. Their social policies did, however, have a much 
greater impact. The provision of services in the fields of 
transport, public housing, schools, day-care centres and health 
care often contributed to improving the living conditions of the 
workers and, in effect they created a kind of local social wage. 
These policies also supplemented the resources provided by the 
traditional institutional fabric, particularly the family, in so 
far as they promoted a growth in female employment and general 
flexibility in employment.
There are, however, important differences in the various 
local policies. Despite the lack of research in this field, we 
do have some indications, with particular reference to the last 
ten years. The red administrations tend, on the whole, to be 
more interventionist than the white councils of the north-east 
(Ferraresi, Kemeny, 1977; Visco Comandini, Volpe, 1982). This 
tendency is particularly noticeable in the areas of land-vise and 




























































































of direct economic intervention. Left-wing administrations are, 
in general, more inclined to adopt urbanistic measures by which 
they try to control land-use in the area and to promote forms of 
public or co-operative housing. In the area of social services, 
their tendency towards a higher degree of interventionism can be 
seen in their attempts to increase the number of services 
available and to assume direct responsibility for their 
operation, as, for example, in the transport sector, day care 
and health care. The white administrations, by contrast, tend to 
intervene less and to delegate the provision of services, for the 
most part, to the Catholic organizations which, however, receive 
some support from public funds. Data that confirm this picture 
can be found in various studies on commune expenditure. These 
show that expenditure and, consequently, the levels of budget 
deficit and debt, tend to be higher in communes controlled by the 
left (19). Expenditure is lower in communes controlled by the DC 
in the white areas though this is not true for DC communes in the 
south (Brosio, Santagata, 1978 ; Aiken, Marinotti, 1980 , 1982 )-. It 
would, however, be mistaken to conclude, from these data, that 
the white communes operate on a purely laissez-faire basis. It 
can, in fact, be shown that they do intervene to maintain the 
equilibrium between the dynamics of the market and the 
traditional local institutions (Cacciari, 1977). There are two 
principal aspects to be considered in this respect . Land-use and 
urban policies have aimed at promoting the interpenetration of 
factory and residence, even though this involves considerable 




























































































of the integrative role of the family. Moreover, these policies 
are, in general, accompanied by support, including financial 
support, for the Catholic network of assistance. In this way, a 
series of services with important cultural and material effects 
is provided, albeit indirectly.
In conclusion, apart from differences which arise from the 
political context, communes have contributed to the localist 
mediation of interests. This has occurred by means of political 
resources which, directly or indirectly, have facilitated the 
integration of and agreement hetween the various actors involved 
in the development of small firms. One should emphasize, here,, 
that this model of activity does not imply direct intervention in 
negotiations between unions and entrepreneurs and their 
associations but it does promote the chances of agreement among 
these actors. On the other hand, the development of concertation 
between local government and interest groups like unions and 
business associations is discouraged by the restricted powers of 
the communes in the economic field and by the limited autonomy of 
interest organizations. The characteristics of this form of 
representation arc, therefore;, different from those of "local 
corporatism" (20). Unions and entrepreneurs operate, rather, 
along the lines of traditional pressure politics directed at the 
parties with a view to obtaining particular advantages. In 
evaluating this phenomenon, we must, obviously, bear in mind the 
fact that the "local political market" is influenced by the 




























































































presence and influence of the various interest groups. In both 
respects, the organizations which are closest to the local 
subculture are in a privileged position.
Another characteristic of this model of relations between 
interest groups and local government is that the former may 
forego the use of vertical organizational structures,for example 
of the unions or the business associations, for the transmission 
of political demands towards the outside. The horizontal 
representation which is provided by the dominant party-local 
government circuit is, in fact, often preferred. Examples of 
this can be found in the recourse of the unions to the communes 
in the already mentioned case of crises in the local firms or in 
the attempts of the entrepreneurs to influence the way in which 
benefits, which are decided at a regional level, are distributed. 
Territorial representation is considered, in these cases, to be 
more effective than the functional representation provided by the 
various interest organizations at regional or central level 
because the latter could entail a greater loss of control over 
the outcome of the issues involved and can be less satisfactory 
from the point of view of local interests (21).
On the whole, representation plays an important role in 
neo-localist regulation of the small-firm economy. Representation 
operates through a network of functional structures (unions, 
business associations and other interest groups), which interact 




























































































areas, and through structures of territorial representation 
(parties, communes) which promote localist regulation by means of 
their interventions and their activity at regional and central 
level. The entire process is influenced by the local subculture 
which provides for the organization of interests but which also 
conditions the forms of interaction among the various actors in 
the local political system.
In the small-firm areas, a social compromise is thus 
established, which is based, on the one hand, on the high 
flexibility of the economy and on its capacity to adapt to 
changes in the market and, on the other, on control of the costs 
and redistribution of the benefits of development. It is 
appropriate to emphasize the local dimension of this flexibility 
and adaptation: not only is the individual area the primary unit 
of reference but the economic, political and social resources 
that facilitate adjustment are, predominantly, endogenous. This 
consideration allows us to have a better understanding of the 
problems of modernization that affect small-firms regions. These 
can, in fact, be summarized in terms of the growing inadequacy of 
local resources to deal with emerging problems.
Problems of modernization and constraints of scale
It is a generalization to maintain that neo-localism is an 




























































































development of small firms. But neo-localism is an ideal-type, 
an abstraction derived from concrete cases. In applying the 
model, therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that a variety of 
tensions and transformations can be found in the concrete cases 
and that these can be specified in differing forms and at 
different times in the various contexts. Moreover, the 
characteristics of the model itself preclude the possibility of 
seeing the development of small firms in terms of discrete and 
distinct stages. It is, therefore, difficult and, in part, 
artificial to isolate and distinguish various phases. Albeit 
with this necessary warning, it is, however, possible to outline 
some basic tendencies. We shall refer to these in summary and 
simplified terms in our attempt to delineate an overall picture 
of current changes.
At an economic level, the ability to confront international 
competition and, particularly, the challenge posed by countries 
with lower labour costs in traditional areas of production 
depends on technological innovation, the promotion of 
entrepreneurial skills and the availability of a suitably trained 
workforce. What is required, therefore, is the development of 
resources and services which are not always to be found, on an 
adequate scale, at local level. The economic literature on small 
firms deals extensively with these questions and shows that it is 
not easy for smaller units of production to internalize 
functions, such as professional and managerial training, 
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conditions. At the same 
involves the consumpt. ion 
costs, in terms of land- 
e disposal and traffic 
adequately at local level
In the context of the small-firm economy, therefore, 
economic innovation poses a territorial problem of scale. This 
raises, in turn, the question of the relationship between small- 
firm areas and the cities as centres of service-provision and, on 
a more general level, the issue of the regional dimension of 
development. hut constraints of scale also imply that the 
economy becomes more dependent on the efficient performance of 
the local political system. The need to experiment with forms of 
cooperation and organization among firms, to ensure that the 
necessary credit facilities are available and to stimulate 
relationships conducive to innovation, among industrial district, 
town and region makes the role of the political system more 
important than it was in the past.
At t he same time, a process
identity and institut ions is taking
assess this phenomenon by means of
indications of its extent can be found
size and in increased part icipation
Some more significant indications
of erosion of traditional 
place. It is difficult to 
quantitative data but some 
in the reduction of family 
in the educational system, 




























































































studies carried out in Tuscany and Veneto. These 
a slow but significant change in the traditional 
This trend appears to be fostered by two factors 
the process of class structuration (22) and 





The first involves a tendency, towards a greater "closure" 
of the social classes which followed the marked individual-family 
mobility of the early stage of development. This however has not 
been accompanied by the emergence of the type of clear-cut social 
cleavages which were characteristic of the classic phase of mass 
industrialization. There is a redefinition of the original 
community identity in a direction more influenced by the diverse 
class positions. Community and class, however, continue to 
coexist and jointly influence local culture. The process of 
secularization proceeds in the same direction, albeit in 
different ways. The latter process is conditioned by economic 
development and by class structuration but it does have its own 
autonomous dynamic which is related to the increase in eductaion 
and the diffusion of mass media, that is, to an opening-up of the 
local society.
In the white areas, there is a growing detachment from the 
original religious matrix, while in the red areas, a substantial 
fall in traditional political participation is taking place.The 
centrality of the communist party as a normative reference point 




























































































the original relationship between cultural identity and political 
orientation. The process of class structuration and that of 
secularization both contribute to the erosion of the original 
political allegiances. The consensus tends to converge around 
more politically specified issues, i.e. to the satisfaction of 
identifiable interests which are defined, for the most part, in 
terms of the class position of the people involved.
The emergence of this phenomenon is reflected in voting 
behaviour. It is possible to formulate the hypothesis that there 
is a movement away from the original interclass orientation of 
the subcultures, particularly in the smaller centres. The change 
occurs, however, in the context of a fall in support for the DC 
in the white areas and of increased support for the PCI in the 
red areas. This leads to a convergence in the levels of support 
for the dominant parties in the various areas. In the case of 
the white area of Hassano, for example, there is an overall fall 
in support for the DC. This is due, to a significant extent, to 
a shift in allegiance among workers (and also among 
entrepreneurs) in small firms and it is particularly marked if 
compared with the political allegiances of the previous 
generation. In the rod area of Valdelsa, there has not been a 
quantitative fall in support for the PCI. This indeed has 
increased over the past ten years, as it has in the central 
regions in general. Nevertheless, the survey on the political 
behaviour of the various social groups suggests that the growth 




























































































increase in the number of workers in the electorate, which, in 
its turn, was due to diffuse industrialization. Vice versa, 
there is a certain detachment from the original subcultural 
matrix among the entrepreneurs, the artisans and the white-collar 
groups of the public and private sectors. In this case, also 
there is a marked difference between the political allegiances of 
the interviewees and the attitudes that they attribute to their 
fat tiers (23).
Generally speaking, ttie thrust of economic and social 
transformation in the small-firm areas, has created new problems 
for the local political systems while the traditional consensus 
that these enjoyed in the past is declining. That is to say, the 
conditions that underlay the previous role of industrial 
relations and local government in neo-localist regulation, are 
being modified. The stability and negotiational character of 
industrial relations are challenged by two different factors. On 
the one hand, market conditions make it difficult for small firms 
to deal effectively with problems of innovation and to guarantee 
the levels of income and employment that have already been 
achieved. On the other hand, the erosion of the traditional 
social fabric, in its turn, influences worker demands. In the 
same way, the traditional consensus, which contained and 
aggregated demands, contributed to the non-problematic nature of 
local politics as did the fact that economic development was 
largely independent from direct political intervention and did 




























































































thus, confine themselves to providing resources that facilitated 
localist regulation of the various interests. With the reduction 
of the regulatory capacity of the market and of the traditional 
institutions, the process of development and the negotiations 
between union and entrepreneurs becomes more dependent on 
political intervention but the resources of the local governments 
are insufficient to deal with this new situation. The need 
arises, therefore, for instruments of mediation and political 
regulation which can tackle more complex situations that those 
encompassed by a neo-localist model.
The limits of regionalization
In the Italian situation, the regional level could provide a 
solution for the problems of scale of the small-firm economy. 
The regions,which were introduced at the beginning of the 1970s, 
have no direct powers in the industrial sector but they can 
intervene in the fields of the artisan sector, land-use policy, 
infrastructure, energy, the labour market and professional 
training. It is true that the transfer of functions to the 
regions was confused and fragmented and that this limits the 
possibility of regional intervention in the economic field. But 
the instruments available could also allow the development of 
"supply policies" directed at providing services to the firms in 
the areas of technological and organizational innovation, labour 



























































































for wide participation oflegislation, generally, provides 
interest groups in the formulation of policies.
The opportunités which are available, have not, however, 
been effectively exploited, at least up to now. From the survey 
carried out in two small-firms regions with different political 
subcultures, Veneto (Christian Democrat) and Tuscany (Communist), 
it emerges that regional intervention in the economic sphere has 
been fragmented and limited. In particular, supply policies for 
small firms have been impeded by the difficulties that the 
regions have experienced in coordinating intersectorial activity
(25) .
In evaluating this situation, the emphasis is usually placed 
on the limited powers of the regions and on the institutional and 
organizational constraints on their interventions. Less 
attention has been paid to the shortcomings of a regional system 
of representation. Yet, the existence of adequate structures of 
interest representation at regional level seem to be a necessary 
condition for the reduction of t ho se constraints and, 
particularly, for the promotion of effective forms of negotiation 
among unions, business associations and regional government. The 
participation of strong and representative interest groups in the 
formulation and implementation of policies could guarantee the 
consensus and the information which are necessary in the case of 



























































































productive structure, such as that of the small-finn economy
(26) .
Why is the passage from localist regulation of interests to 
representation and concertation on a regional level so difficult? 
First of all, steps in the direction of regionalization are 
hindered by the behaviour of the parties which does not help 
reduce the institutional constraints on regional intervention. 
In Veneto, a crucial factor in this regard is the weakness of the 
DC as a party and the extent to which it can be penetrated, by 
heterogeneous interests which have a local base. The 
difficulties involved in mediating among various localisms push 
the party into distributive and fragmented regional policies. 
These, in turn, discourage any strategic and organizational 
investment by unions and business associations at a regional 
level. The PCI in Tuscany has a stronger identity and is better 
organized but it is wary of delegating power to interest groups 
and tends to try to increase direct intervent ions of the.public 
sector. The party, therefore, has not favoured the effective 
involvement of unions and the business associations in the 
formulation and organization of policies in the economic field
(27) .
The result of this weakness of regional political 
infrastructures, capable of defining and aggregating demands, is 
that, in both regions, the administrators often have to face 





























































































among various interests with strong local orientations. Their 
interventions tend, consequently, to be fragmented and to 
contradict the formal objectives of planning. Often decisions 
are not taken and these "non-decisions" result in the 
underutilization of those resources which are available.
The behaviour of the parties does not encourage the 
regionalization of the political system nor does it promote the 
substitution of localist regulation. But how do the unions and 
business associations react to this tendency? The former see 
activity on a regional level as a means of strengthening their 
position in that it could provide political resources to 
reinforce their negotiational position on the economic front. 
This attitude, however, conflicts with that of the parties and, 
as we shall see, with that of the business associations. The 
unions could, of course, modify this situation, at least in part, 
concentrating their contractual power more at regional level. 
This, however, is hindered by two series of factors. First of 
all, the behaviour of the parties and the business associations 
make the result of strategic investment at regional level very 
uncertain while, at the same time, the risks of intra- 
orgariizat ional tensions are increased. Secondly, a 
redistribution of power between the various levels can obviously 
not be brought about without the endorsement of the 
organizations at the centre. But these, in an attempt to improve 
their own contractual position vis-à-vis the government and




























































































of the peripheral levels. On the whole, the unions have, so far, 
made only a limited contribution to the regionalization of the 
political system.
As for the business associations, the development of 
political activity and the growth of their autonomy from their 
members are usually a sort of second-best option, an adjustment 
to new conditions imposed by the unions or by public intervention 
(Martinelli, Sclunitter, Gtreeck, 1981). It is unlikely that 
these associations will adopt a political role in the absence of 
pressure from these sources. It is more likely that they will 
try, as, indeed, they do in Tuscany and Veneto, to strengthen 
their own position by means of economic activity (e.g. by 
providing services to the firms). This is, in fact, an easier 
strategy to pursue since' it does not pose problems of political 
aggregation of business interests and does not go against the 
small entrepreneurs decided preference for the advantages offered 
by localist regulation. On the other hand, the .central 
leadership of business organizations, like that of the unions, 
has, up to now, given very limited support to the regionalization 
of representation (28).
Because of the situation described above, the structures of 
interest representation are not well developed at regional level. 
They have less organizational resources (personnel, funds) at 
their disposal than at provincial levels and have limited 




























































































regional government take the form of consultation. There is 
little evidence of concertation as an instrument for improving 
the efficacy of regional interventions and for confronting the 
new problems of scale.
What are the consequences of the tendencies that we have
just examined ? It is dif f icuIt t o give a precise answer. The
preceding remarks certainly do not support the hypothesis that 
the development of small firms is entering into a crisis. There 
is insufficient evidence for an evaluation of this kind and, 
indeed, the spontaneous adjustments that market stimuli can bring
about in t he various areas should not be undervalued. On the
basis of the tendencies we have discussed, however, we can
reasonably hypothesize that localist regulation tends to become 
inadequate as problems associated with modernization emerge, 
while it is difficult to establish effective regulation on a 
regional level. In tlu; future, political constraints will have a 
growing influence on the possibilities of economic innovation.and 
will increase the risks of higher social costs of adjustment. If 
this hypothesis is well-founded, one can also hold that the 
advantages of neo-localism for the national political economy 





























































































Neo-localism and Central Concertation
Since the second half of the 1970s, the regulation of the 
economy at a central level has been characterized by attempts at 
concertation among government , unions and business associations. 
The agreements that these reached have, however, turned out to be 
very unstable. The institutionalization of concertation has 
remained limited and the results uncertain. This has contributed 
to the fostering of tensions inside union organizations and also 
to divisions among the various confederations. It is not easy to 
reconstruct the way these developments occurred. This task would 
require that various factors of an economic, political and 
institutional nature be considered and this cannot be undertaken 
here. In the light of the preceding analysis, however, we are 
interested in raising a particular question. What role has the 
development of small firms played in this process? Diffuse 
industrialization at the periphery and concertation at the centre 
are, usually, considered separately. But it is useful, at least 
on an exploratory level, to formulate hypotheses on the extent 
and type of their interdependence.
In this context, some suggestions can be found in the recent 
article by John Goldthorpe, to which we have already referred. 
Goldthorpe identifies two types of response to the economic and 
social tensions that have affected advanced industrial societies 
in recent years: dualism and corporatism. The first involves the 




























































































union organizations. Dualism, as we have seen, is based on the 
attempt to limit, rather than to recognize, the power of trade 
unions and involves the growth of productive and occupational 
areas which are excluded from union representation and which, are 
regulated, primarily, by market mechanisms. The two tendencies 
are seen as being basically incompatible for reasons which we can 
summarize as follows: dualism weakens union organization because 
it involves an expansion of the productive and occupational 
sectors which are not controlled by them. The result is that 
unions focus more on the defence of the sectorial interests of 
their own members while the interest of the business and 
government in the concertation of economic and social policies is 
reduced. Even though concertation and dualism can co-exist for a 
certain period, the strengthening of the latter creates, over 
time, the cultural and institutional premises for neo-liberal 
policies with decreased public intervention in the economic field 
and a decrease in the dimensions and scope of the welfare state.
In evaluating this hypothesis, it is necessary, of course, 
to bear in mind that it is formulated within a general analytical 
framework which attempts to explain transformations in advanced 
industrial societies. Any attempt to apply it to Italy, however, 
raises problems, particularly since the co-existence of neo- 
localist concertation and dualism has been considered as a 
typical characteristic of the Italian situation (Regini, 1984). 
Dualism, though it is widespread, is not a predominant tendency 




























































































concertation, though t tie latter is loss consolidated here than in 
other countries.
It is difficult to deny that. central concertation and 
peripheral dualism do co-exist in the Italian context. The 
question remains, however, of the specific relationship between 
ttie two phenomena. It is necessary to establish whether these 
developed in largely autonomous forms, or a reciprocal 
relationship existed and, if so, of what type. We should like to 
dwell on this point and try to show, in hypothetical terms, that 
the co-existence of the two tendencies involves contradictions 
which, on the one hand, condition the stability and efficacy of 
concertation and, on the other, have a negative influence on the 
process of modernization of the diffuse economy. As a first step 
in this direction, it is necessary to look at the development of 
small firms in other than strictly dualist terms. The localist 
perspective can contribute to an explanation in terms of the 
"contradictory co-existence", rather than the basic 
incompatibility of concertation and diffuse industrialization.
Dualism, as we have seen, is an important component in t tie 
small firm economy. If, however, it is considered within the 
wider context of localist regulation, it is possible to identify 
a series of factors which show that the growth of small 
productive units and the existence of concertation at a central 
level are not necessarily incompatible. First of all the growth 




























































































organization. In fact, in the 1070s, unionization grew 
appreciably and reached very high levels in the areas which were 
most affected by small firm development. What we have in these 
areas, therefore, is not the absence of representation but, 
rather, a form of interest organization and coordination which is 
oriented in a negotiational and localist direction. This means 
that neither the unions nor the business associations in small- 
firm areas are necessarily opposed to centralized agreements. On 
the contrary, both these actors may at times find in these 
agreements opportunités to improve their own positions without 
wasting resources at a local level.
Thus, for example, the unions have an interest in any 
possible benefits, in the areas of social policy and taxation, 
that can be gained from national agreements, as long as these do 
not leac to limitations on firm-based negotiations. This is 
particularly true in cases which negotiations on firm level are 
particularly favourable to workers. The entrepreneurs, in their 
turn, seem to prefer more decentralized industrial relations as 
long as they are protected from union demands, as happens in the 
smaller and artisan firms. But where local unions are stronger, 
the entrepreneurs tend to see more centralized wage agreements as 
a sort of defence against local demands. Indeed, this attitude 
emerged very clearly from our own case studies (30).
On the whole,contrary to what a dualist perspective might 




























































































necessarily involve the absence of trade union representation. 
Nor does it imply an explicit and generalized resistence to 
central agreements on the part of union and business interests. 
Indeed, the opposite can even occur in that social bases which
are more f avourable t o central agreements can be found in the
small-firm economy. It is, however, possible to ident ify one
factor which, in spite of the perferences of the actors involved, 
causes the development of the small-firm economy to actually 
hinder the stability and effectiveness of centra] concertation.
In this regard it is necessary to bear in mind that 
concertation is usually considered by the actors involved as a 
second-best solution. This arrangement is accepted by the 
principal protagonists, particularly the government and employers 
as a means of avoiding or preventing the disruptive effects of 
union demands on the economic and political systems (31). It is 
possible to hypothesize that, in the Italian situation, diffuse 
industrialization has helped to reduce the vulnerability.of the 
economic and political system to union activity, which had 
increased substantially in the early 70s. Indicators of these
tendencies are not to be found directly in the process of
unionizat ion , which increased throughout the 70s and was
part icularly marked in small industrial firms, but, rather, in
the consequences that diffuse industrialization has had for the 
control of economic and social tensions. Diffuse 
industrialization, in fact, compensated for the serious 




























































































demands,and, thus, disruptive effects on employment, on income 
and, therefore, on the political consensus were avoided.
Considering the rate of employment in industry, for example, 
one can see that the overall increase between the two censuses of 
1971 and 1981 (+12%) was due, entirely, to the increase in the
number of v/orkers in firms with less than 50 employees while
there was a decrease in the number employed in firms with more
than 500 employees. In regions like Piedmont and Lombardy, there 
were decreases of more than 25% in firms.with more than 1,000 
employees. There was an overall decrease in the rate of
industrial employment in Piedmont and Liguria. The rate remained 
stable in Lombardy where there was a greater growth in small 
firms than in other regions of the north-west. The central and 
north-eastern regions, however, show an overall increase in 
industrial employment with an average of about 25%. This was due 
to a growth in the number of workers in smaller units. The 
dynamism of the areas of diffuse industrialization can also be 
seen in the data on exportation. In the 1970s, both the
traditional and modern sectors which were based on small firms 
made an increasing contribution to overall exports. What is 
more, the percentage contribution of the centre and north-east 
increased by ten points in the period 1968-1978 (from 28 to 38%) 





























































































One can, therefore, hypothesize that, as a consequence of 
these tendencies, the growth of small firms contributed, 
significantly, towards making the consensus of the unions less 
indispensible for the formulation of policies aimed at 
controlling the economic crisis. In particular, the government 
and employers were not faced with a clear-cut alternative between 
a costly political agreement on the one hand and the loss of 
control over economic and social tensions on the other.
An effective policy, coordinated at central level would, in 
fact, have required the business associations to be highly 
representative and to be able to ensure that individual firms 
would not exercise any prerogatives, in terms of productive 
restructuring, negotiations etc., unilaterally. Any such 
development was, however, hindered by the marked structural and 
territorial heterogeneity of business interests. The government, 
in its turn, would have had to modify its social and fiscal 
policies considerably and this would have triggered negative 
reactions in certain interest groups, particularly the self- 
employed who had been privileged and protected in the past (33). 
It would also have been necessary to re-organize the 
administrative structures so as to increase their effectiveness 
and efficiency and to reduce "colonization" on the part of 
particular interests (34).
It is difficult to establish the extent to which these



























































































change in the relative strength of political forces and in the 
composition of the government itself. At any rate, the preceding 
remarks suggest that the development of small firms has acted as 
a sort of "safety-valve" for employers and government. This has 
enabled difficult and costly choices to be avoided but it has 
also contributed, indirectly, to reducing the necessity for and, 
therefore, the productivity of concert at ion. Pressure from 
particularist interests, which would have been adversely affected 
by efficacious agreements with the unions, was not adequately 
contained. This pressure was often successful in the 
implementation of agreements and this brought about a reduction 
in the advantages that the unions expected to receive - for 
example in the areas of industrial, occupational, social and 
fiscal policies - in exchange for moderation in economic and wage 
demands. This, in its turn, produced rising tensions within the 
unions.
This is, of course, a very simplified picture and it does 
not take account of the development of concertation which 
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s (35). This period 
saw, among other things, a more general change in the national 
political equilibrium. The PCI returned to opposition after the 
phase of "national solidarity". Apart from these changes, 
however, the fact remains that the last ten years have been 
characterized by a low productivity of concertation in the area 
of social and economic policy. The most obvious indications of




























































































double that of other industrialized countries, and in the marked 
growth in public deficit which was due to a significant increase 
in expenditure coupled with a lower rate of increase in tax 
returns .
These tendencies are certainly different from those found in 
countries which have more stable forms of central concertation. 
But neither are they what a dualist perspective would lead one to 
expect. The development of small firms has not, in fact, brought 
about a significant re-orientation of central policies in a neo- 
liberal direction, at least up to now. What has happened, 
rather, is that this development has helped to compensate, to a 
significant extent, for the effects of weak and largely 
ineffective central regulation. This phenomenon has not yet been 
thoroughly analyzed and it cannot be treated adequately here. 
But there are indications that it involves a decline in 
preexisting forms of interest mediation, based on the exclusion 
of worker representation. The development of concert at ion, 
however, has not led to full inclusion of the labour movement. 
Trends in inflation and in public expenditure show that there is 
tendency to satisfy new demands without a consistent redefinition 
of the interests which were previously protected (36). The 
development of small firms, particularly in so far as this 
improved exports, employment and incomes, financed this uncertain 
"political exchange". This made the adoption of more radical 
and, therefore, more costly policies less necessary. On the 




























































































permissive fiscal policy have, in their turn, contributed to the 
success of the diffuse economy.
But there is another side to the coin which is often 
neglected by those who contrast the vitality of small firms and 
of localism to the weakness of the centre (38). The prevailing 
tendencies and the uncertainty of concert at ion at the centre do 
have some long-term consequences for the diffuse economy: they 
condition its possibilities for modernization. In this regard, 
we have already noted, albeit with due cautions about the dangers 
of generalization, that the small-firm economy is, increasingly, 
facing problems of scale and is becoming more dependent on the 
efficient performance of the political system. In this 
situation, localist regulation turns out to be inadequate while 
the regional dimension is not all well developed.
The particular differentiation of the productive and 
occupational structures demands that regulatory instruments be 
highly flexible and well articulated. It also requires an 
ability to pursue objectives from the point of view of supply as 
well as of demand. The utilization of the regional level and the 
participation of interests in decentralized regulation become 
particularly important in this context. It is not difficult to 
see, however, how this process has been hindered by the 
tendencies which predominate at central level. First of all, 
from an institutional point of view, the government, under 




























































































clear division of resources and powers and adequate coordination 
between central level and regional and local government. This 
has given rise to serious limitations for regional activity in 
the economic field, even in sectors where intervention at this 
level would be most appropriate. As a consequence, the 
development of concertation has become more difficult because 
unions and business associations have no incentive to inve?st in 
the regional level. On the other hand, this tendency has not 
been encouraged by the leaders of the respective interests at 
central level, These have, rather, tried to increase their 
influence on political choices and have neglected the role of 
more decentralized forms of regulation.
The overall result is a "contradictory coexistence" between 
neo-localism and concertation. The first reduced the problems of 
"governability" in the short term but it contributed, indirectly, 
towards making central concertation and regulatory interventions 
more difficult in the long term. On the other hand,the weakness 
of the centre and the fragmented character of its policies has 
limited and will continue to limit the chances of modernization 
of the small-firm economy.
Our analysis, therefore, leads us to emphasize the 
ambivalent character of the relationship between neo-localism and 
central concertation. From this perspective, the Italian 
situation does not fit into models of institutionalized central 




























































































This ambivalence also raises the question of the validity of 
certain policies which are proposed in the context of the current 
debate and in which centre and periphery usually appear as poles 
of a "zero-sum" cjaine. These policies, in fact, look either to 
model of strongly centralized neo-corporatist concert at ion, which 
is now facing increasing difficulties even in areas where it was 
well established, or to a radically decentralized solution. 
Without entering into this discussion here, we should like to 
emphasize that the preceding analysis suggests a different 
approach. The reduction of the negative effects of the present 
interaction between central and local regulation calls for a 
different kind of equilibrium between centre and periphery. This 
equilibrium, on the one hand, should not exclude the possibility 
of using political resources to influence basic economic choices 
and the territorial and social distribution of inequality; on the 
other, it should stimulate the capacity for political and 






























































































1) For a comprehensive picture of the research project, which was
coordinated by Arnaldo Bagnasco and Carlo Trigilia, see the 
contributions that have already been published: Bagnasco,
Pini (1981); Trigilia (1981); Bagnasco, Trigilia (eds., 
1984a; 1984b). See also the article by Bagnasco in Stato e
Hercato (1985) which deals, in particular, with the social 
aspects of the small-firm economy.
2) For an analysis of the initial debate on the labour market, 
see Paci (1973); for the following debate on the 
decentralization of production and small firms, see Bagnasco 
(1977 ) .
3) Among the numerous contributions, see Becattini (1978, 1979),
Varaldo(ed. 1979), Brusco (1980), Garofali (1981), Rullani 
(1982, 1983), Sabel (1982) Sabel and Piore (1984). See also
two recent readers edited by Goglio (1982) and Fua and Zacchia 
(1983) .
4) For a more thorough discussion of this aspect which also 
refers to the vast historical literature, see Trigilia (1981). 
From the point of view of political sociology, the work of 
Sivini (1971) and Farneti (1971) is particularly relevant. On 




























































































5) For an analysis of these developments from an electoral point 
of view, which leads to the identification of two homogeneous 
areas - the "red" and the "white" - see Galli (1968).
6) On the dynamic of unionization up to 1977, reference must be 
made to the research coordinated by Roinagnoli (1980). See 
Romagnoli (1985) for a review of more recent tendencies.
7) In particular, factors like these should be taken into 
consideration in explaning the case of the Marches. Diffuse 
industrialization occurred more recently here and the 
Communist subculture was less deeply rooted from the outset. 
Indeed, in this regard, the Marches appear to be divided into 
the north, which is more influenced by the Socialist and 
Communist tradition and the south, which is more Catholic and 
Christian Democratic. In the case of Umbria, although the 
period and forms of development are similar to those of the 
Marches, unionization reached higher levels. One could 
hypothesize that this phenomenon is influenced by the greater 
strength of the Communist tradition though the institutional 
rooting of the subculture is weaker than in Tuscany and 
Emilia. In any case, apart from the levels of unionization, 
active union representation in the small firms appears to be 
less developed in both Umbria and the Marches. For the 
Marches, see the research coordinated out by Paci (1980) and 





























































































8) A study promoted by the CESEC in 1982 on blue and white collar 
workers in small firms (with between 20 and 200 employees), in 
the north of Italy, found an overall rate of unionization of 
69%. This rate fell to 50.4% in firms with 20-49 employees 
and rose to over 70% in those with 100-200 employees, 
(unpublished data, kindly provided by Paolo Ceri).
9) It is important to note that the frequency of conflicts in 
small firm regions tended to be higher than in Piedmont and 
than the national average. This was probably due more to the 
fragmentation of the productive structure than to the 
diffusion of firm-level negotiations (Bordogna, 1980). On the 
development of conf1ictuality, in terms of strikes, see 
Bordogna, Provasi (1979) and for a review of more recent 
tendencies see Bordogna (1985).
10) For the former, see Heilman's discussion of the PCI "politica 
delle alleanze" (alliance policy) at local level. On the 
relationships between unions and the "white" subculture, see 
Fasol ( 1980 ) .
11) On the development of collective bargaining and, in 





























































































12) For a more thorough examination of this aspect, in addition 
to the case studies on Bassano and Valdelsa, see Bagnasco 
(1985).
13) These changes are probably more noticeable in the "white" 
areas where the process of union autonomization introduced 
greater tensions between it and the dominant party in the 
local political system (Carbognin, 1981). The existence of 
limited but more severe conflictuality in Veneto is indicated 
by the data on strikes which were previously examined.
14) For an ideal-typical construction of the charateristics of 
both subcultures in this phase, see Alberoni (1967).
15) Some interesting points on the evolution of the activity of 
the red communes can be found in Cammelli (1978) and Galli 
(1981) .
16) On the relationship between ideological consensus and 
political demand, see Pizzorno (1969).
17) Some empirical evidence of the greater stability of local 
governments in the subcultural areas can be found in a recent 
study by Parisi (1984).
18) A study which documented this process well was carried out in 




























































































19) Since 1977-78, institutional measures which limit the 
possibility of an increase in deficit expenditure have been 
enacted. On the policies of financial control of local 
agencies and on its effects, see Dente (1983).
20) This concept was used, with reference to the Norwegian case 
by Hernes and Selvik. See also Cawson's (1984) contribution 
to this topic.
21) Tarrow (1978) has pointed out the possibility of territorial 
representation being revived because of the difficulties 
being experienced by functional representation.
22) On the structuration of social classes, see Giddens (1975).
23) Empirical evidence of the limited penetration of the salaried 
middle classes by the PCI, despite the growth of the party in 
the 1970s, can be found in a survey on patterns of change in 
voting behaviour in Bologna which was carried out by the 
Istituto Cattaneo (Barbagli et al., 1979).
24) On this aspect, see, among others, Antonelli and Momigliano 
(1980), Borzaga and Formica (1982), and Camagni, Cappellin 
and Garofoli (1984).
25) On the limits of industrial policies, see Lassini (1980, 




























































































principally to the cases studied and relates to policies on 
the development of small firms. For example, the possibility 
of non-homogenous behaviour in the various red areas cannot 
be excluded. At any rate, the regional studies suggest that 
the differences between red and white areas can be seen most 
clearly in the area of social policy. Differences in the 
performance of the non-autonomous regions clearly emerge from 
the indicators used by Putman, Leonardi, Nanetti and 
Pavoncello (1981).
26) It is necessary to remember that developments in this 
direction, which are related to supply policies, do not 
necessarily require an increase in expenditure and they can, 
therefore, partly overcome the constraints that are imposed, 
from this point of view, on the regional government. Some 
interesting points on the idea that the use of private actors 
as instruments of public policy can reduce the risks of 
inefficiency in direct interventions of the state are 
developed in tlayntz ( 1983) and Schmitter and Streeck ( 1985).
27) It is difficult to assess precisely how much this tendency 
has been fostered by the weakness of the business 
associations and by their diffidence towards the PCI. But it 
has certainly been affected by the original identity of the 
party. Maintaining that identity is still important in a 




























































































far as it influences the distribution of " collective 
incentives" to militants. One can hypothesize that this 
factor makes the shift from a de facto localist agreement 
with the employers to explicit cooperation, by means of 
regional concert at ion, more difficult. See Bagnasco and 
Trigilia (1984b).
28) On regional representation of the business associations which 
are members of Confindustria, see SITEA (1981).
29) In both Tuscany and Veneto, the personnel and budgets of the 
principal parties and interest groups at a regional level are 
less than those available in the corresponding structures in 
a single province (the Tuscan province of Siena, where the 
greater part of Valdelsa is located and the Venetian province 
of Vicenza, of which the area of Bassano is a part).
30) 70% of the industrial employers in Valdelsa and 53% in
Bassano said they were in favour of increasing the importance 
of union negotiations at central level and of limiting 
negotiations at firm level to non-wage issues. This attitude 
is positvely correlated to firm size and level of 
unionization. The existence, in small firm areas,of social 
and political bases which are not unfavourable to central 
agreements is also supported by a study on reactions of 
unions on the periphery to policies of wage moderation




























































































31) The grov/th of interdependence among the various actors 
(government, employers and unions) can be considered as a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the development 
of concertation. This presupposes, in its turn, a relative 
equilibrium in power resources which discourages unilateral 
decisions. For a more thorough discussion of this aspect, 
see Bordogna and Provasi (1984, Chap.IV) and Schmitter and 
Streeck (1985). Carrieri and Donolo (1983) have drawn 
attention to recent economic and political tendencies which, 
by weakening the unions,could make central concertation even 
more difficult. A more cautious opinion, put forward by 
Regini (1983, 1984), emphasizes that the current process,
although it does involve a deterioration of the "terms of 
exchange" for the unions, might not necessarily lead to the 
end of centralized political negotations.
32) For the contribution of the "peripheral" sectors to exports 
in the 1970s, see Del Monte and Fotia (1980); for the 
territorial distribution of exports, see Benedetti (1983).
33) This aspect was central to the scientific and political 
debate of the 1970s. See, among others, Pizzorno (1974), 
Berger and Piore (1982) and Paci (ed., 1978).
34) As is well known, unlike the current Italian connotations of 




























































































the autonomy and efficiency of state agencies (Schmitter, 
1984 ) .
35) On this aspect, see Regini (1984) and numerous contributions 
in the book edited by CESOS (1985).
36) For a more thorough exposition of this perspective, see 
Salvati (1978, 1984). A good example of this tendency is to 
be seen in the development of the Italian welfare state in 
the 1970s. See Ascoli (ed., 1984).
37) On the role of this factor in the growth of exports in small 
firms in the 1970s, see Rullani (1979).
38) The perspective adopted by the CENSIS (1982) is typical from 




























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 : Small firm regions and political subcultures
1971-1972.
The vertical axis shows the percentages of workers employed in 
manufacturing industries in local units with less than 250 
employees in the 1971 census;
the horizontal axis measures the level of industrialization by 
means of the ratio of workers employed in manufacturing industry 
to the resident population in 1971.
The political subcultures are identified by means of the ratio of 
DC and PCI votes obtained in the elections for the Chamber of 
Deputies in 1972 to the total DC and PCI vote in each region.
^  PCI dominance (where the ratio of DC votes to the combined 
DC-PCI votes in each region is 10 or more points lower than that 
ratio on a national level, which is 58.7%).
DC dominance (where the ratio of DC votes to the combined DC- 
PCI vote in each region is 10 or more points higher than the ratio 
on a national level).
O  Relative equilibrium between the DC and PC (where the ratio 
of DC votes to the combined DC-PCI vote in each region is equal to 
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Figure 2: Rate of unionization - CISL and CGIL - in industry by 
geographical area
Sources: For the period up to 1977, Romagnoli (ed., 1980); for
1983, CESOS (unpublished data). The method used to 
calculate the rate of unionization in 1983 is the same 






















































































































































































F i g u r e  3:
Figure 3: Rate of unionization - CISL and CGIL - in industry by 
region
Source: See Fig. 2 (the data for the period up to 1977 were
gathered during research coordinated by Romagnoli but 






















































































































































































F i g u r e  4:
Figure 4: Union affiliation (CISL-CIGL) of union members in 
industry and political subcultures in 1972.
The vertical axis shows CISL members in the industrial sector as 
a percentage of the total regional membership of the CISL and the 
CGIL in the same sector. The horizontal axis shows the 
relationship between the DC vote in the elections for the Chamber 






















































































































































































T a b l e  I:
1969-1973 1974-1978 1979-1982
a b c d a b c d a b c d
Piemonte 1761 28.5 1481 43.7 1073 22.2 2747 18.1 992 14.4 3452 19.6
Trentino A.A . 889 51.4 458 36.3 643 93.1 660 16.7 503 32.2 1151 14.2
Friuli 1552 47.2 1169 29.3 1372 36.8 2856 14.7 1149 39.8 2948 9.8
Veneto 1272 43.8 903 34.2 861 29.8 1993 14.9 540 14.9 2766 13.1
Emilia 1890 37.1 1815 29.0 1634 25.5 5819 11.7 1191 15.0 6765 11.8
Toscana 1616 45.9 1337 28.1 1361 26.7 4548 12.2 1195 17.0 5162 13.8
Umbria 615 35.0 758 25.1 440 14.8 2113 10.8 410 12.7 2893 11.1
Marche 780 48.3 571 29.4 902 34.9 1296 20.8 468 18.2 1930 13.4
ITALIA 1279 34.1 1224 32.8 812 24.2 3436 14.8 674 13.8 3572 13.7
a b l e  1 :  I n d i c a t o r s  o f  e o n f l i c t u a l i t y  ( a v e r a g e  v a l u e s )
a )  h o u r s  o f  s t r i k e  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  e m p l o y e e s  ( i n  t h o u s a n d s ) ;
b )  n u m b e r  o f  s t r i k e s  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  e m p l o y e e s ;
c)  n u m b e r  o f  s t r i k e r s  p e r  s t r i k e ;
d )  n u m b e r  o f  w o r k  h o u r s  l o s t  p e r  s t r i k e r .
1 )  i n  o r d e r  t o  k e e p  t h e  d a t a  h o m o g e n o u s ,  s t r i k e s  f o r  " m o t i v e s  
e x t e r n a l  t o  t h e  w o r k  r e l a t i o n s " ,  t h a t  i s ,  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s ,  o n  
w h i c h  I S T A T  p r o v i d e s  i n f o r m a t  i o n  f r o m  1 9 7 5  o n w a r d s ,  h a v e  n o t  
b e e n  i n c l u d e d .  h o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  d o  n o t  s h o w  s u f f i c i e n t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  t o  a l t e r  t h e  r e g i o n a l  p r o f i l e s  t h a t  c a n  b e  s e e n  
f r o m  t h e  T a b l e .
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